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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Charles Antell, Inc., is a Maryland Corporation, which
produces and markets cosmetic products. This company carries
on a sales program in the State of Utah through radio and
television stations, one of which stations is Television Station
KDYL located in Salt Lake City, Utah. For a number of months
Television Station KDYL carried an advertising program
sponsored by Charles Antell, Inc., wherein they advertised a
product known as ((Formula No. 9." The television program,
after extolling the virtues of the product, would instruct the
listeners desiring to buy the product to call a given telephone
number and place their orders. The telephone number given
is the telephone number of Television Station KDYL. Upon
receiving a phone call, Television Station KDYL would take
the order for the product, which would later be shipped
C.O.D. from Baltimore, Maryland, to the person making
the order. Although an affidavit in the file from an officer
of Charles Antell, Inc., states that all orders were taken subject to approval by the company in Maryland, such was not·
the indication of the advertising, nor was such indicated by
the switchboard girl at Television KDYL who takes the
orders.
The testimony of lvlrs. Macel Thurmond in the file is to
the effect that when she called Television Station KDYL she
gave her order for the product and was assured by the girl
answering the phone that the product would be shipped to
her in approximately ten days, with no qualification based
upon the acceptance of the order by Charles Antell, Inc. This
procedure went on for a number of months, at least from
the n1onth of February 1952 until the month of May 1952.
4
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In February of 1952, appellant, Betty Anderson McGriff,
ordered a jar of "Formula No. 9," which was in due course
of time delivered to her. As a result of the use of this product,
she suffered severe skin injury. An action was commenced
against Charles Antell, Inc., and others. Charles/ Antell, Inc.,
had not qualified to do business in the State of Utah by filing
the necessary papers with the Secretary of State, nor had the
corporation appointed a process agent within the state. Furthermore, there appeared to be none of the officers of the
corporation "rithin the State of Utah. Consequently, service
of summons was made on Mr. Sidney S. Fox, managing director
of Television Station KDYL.
A motion was made by Charles Antell, Inc., to quash
service of this summons, which motion was granted by the
District Court. This appeal is taken from the order quashing
this service.

ARGUMENT
I
SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN THIS CASE WAS MADE
UPON THE PROPER INDIVIDUAL.
The method of service of summons upon a non-resident
corporation is provided by Subsection (e) ( 4) of Rule 4,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which is substantially identical
with Section 104-5-11 ( 5), Utah Code, Annotated, 1943. This
section provides in applicable part as follows:
5
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tel£ no such officer or agent can be found in the state
and the defendant has, or advertises to hold itself out
as having an office or place of business in this state,
or does business in this state, then upon the person doing such business or in charge of such office or place
of business."

It is not controverted that there is no officer of the
corporation within the State of Utah, nor is there a designated
process agent within the State of Utah. The company solicits
business and accepts orders through Television Station KDYL.
Likewise it is not controverted that the person in charge of
Television KDYL is Sidney S. Fox, upon whom the summons
was served.
The only question to be determined, therefore, under this
appeal is whether or not Charles Antell, Inc., was doing
business within the State of Utah, within the contemplation
of the statute above cited.

II

CHARLES ANTELL, INC., A CORPORATION, WAS
DOING BUSINESS WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH.
There have been a number of cases decided by this ·court
determining what constitutes doing business within the state
by a foreign. corporation, so as to make it subject to process
served within the state. In determining this case, it is necessary
only to fit the legal principles already determined to the particular facts which we have here.
6
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Many of the earlier cases decided in various jurisdictions
tn this country held that mere solicitation of business by a
corporation within a state does not constitute doing business
'vithin that state, and that in order to become subject to the
jurisdiction of the Courts of such state, some other activity
additional to the solicitation of business was necessary.
While the Courts have continued to give lip service to
this principle, the amount of additional activity required has
been cut down and down until at the present time it appears
that only a mere scintilla of activity, other than mere solicitation, is necessary. In practical effect at the present time, the
rule is that solicitation itself is sufficient. However, in this case
we have more than a mere solicitation of business within the
state. The company actually maintained an office within the
state, which office accepted orders for the company. The
company advertised on television the telephone number of
such office and invited orders and inquiries to be made at such
office regarding their products. Furthermore, according to the
testimony of Mrs. Thurmond, it appears that contracts were
actually consummated within this state for the purchase of
defendant Charles Antell, Inc.'s products. It is true that the
affidavits on file from the officers of the defendant corporation
maintain that the local agents had no authority to enter into
contracts but merely had authority to take orders to be transmitted to the company in Maryland. This, of course, is an
intra-company arrangement about which the pla:intiff, nor
anyone else on the outside would have no knowledge. However, the facts as they appear from the evidence, are entirely
contrary to this position. The advertising of the company
was to the effect that orders could be placed with Television
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Station KDYL. These advertisements did not state that the
orders were taken by Television Station KDYL subject to
approval by the Baltimore, Maryland office of Charles Antell,
Inc. Furthermore, according to Mrs. Thurmond's testimony
when she called and placed the order, the girl who answered
the telephone at Television Station KDYL took the order
and assured her that the product would be shipped to her,
without any qualification as to later acceptance or approval
of the order by Charles Antell, Inc. It appears, therefore, that
the company was holding out to the public that their local
agent, Television Station KDYL, had authority to enter into
contract for the purchase of uFormula No. 9."
Although, as pointed out above, there are a multitude of
cases decided on this point, both in this jurisdiction and other
jurisdictions, it appears to be necessary to consider only the
recent expressions of this Court on the subject, as these cases
fully analyze the earlier cases and the recent trends in regard
to this problem.
In the case of Industrial Commission vs. Kemmerer Coal
Co.J decided by this Court in 1944, 150 Pac. (2d) 373, suit
was bro:ught against Kemmerer Coal Co., a Wyoming corporation, which had not qualified to do business in the State
of Utah, and which had not appointed a resident process agent.
The company maintained solicitors in the State of Utah, which
solicited orders which were transmitted to the company's
office in Wyoming to be filled. The company did maintain an
office in the state, on the door if which its name appeared,
and also had a listed telephone number for such office. This
office was used largely for the convenience of its solicitors.
8
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Service of summons was made in the case upon an employee
in such office. The Court quashed the service of summons
upon the grounds that it was not made upon the person in
charge of such office, but in passing upon the question of
\\·hether or not the activities of the company constituted doing
business in the state, the Cotut stated, at page 374:
ttWhat is considered Hdoing business" by a foreign
corporation so as to make it present within the state
for the purpose of serving process upon it also depends upon the facts and the statute in each particular
case. The case of Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co.,
205 U. S. 530, 27 S. Ct. 595, 51 L.Ed. 916, is often
cited as one of the leading cases holding that solicitation of business by agents of a foreign corporation does
not constitute Hdoing business." This case involved the
interpretation of a Federal staute and the court expressly indicated that under some state statutes this
might not be true. From a reading of the later cases
it would appear that very little more than mere solicitation is necessary to constitute ((doing business" by a
foreign corporation in a state other than its domicile
to subject it to the jurisdiction of its courts. See Tauza
v .Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E.
915; American Asphalt Roof Corp. v. Shankland, 205
Iowa 862, 219 N.W. 28, 60 A.L.R. 986 and note (b)
commencing on page 1034; International Shoe Co. v.
Lovejoy, 219 Iowa 204, 257 N.W. 576, 101 A.L.R.
122 and note commencing on page 139; Frene v.
Louisville Cement Co., 77 U. S. App. D.C. 129, 134
F. 2d 511, 514, 146 A.L.R. 926, in which case the
court in analyzing the modern trend of courts in
determining what constitutes ctdoing business" by a
foreign corporation for the purpose of being amenable
to the service of process, said:
"The tradition has grown that personal jurisdiction

9
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of a foreign corporation cannot be acquired when the
only basis is (mere solicitation' of business within the
borders of the forum's sovereignty. And this is true,
whether the solicitation is only casual or occasional
or is regular, continuous and long continued.
((The tradition crystallized when it was thought that
nothing less than concluding contracts could constitute (doing business' by foreign corporations, an idea
now well exploded. It is now recognized that maintaining many kinds of regular business activity constitutes tdoing business' in the jurisdictional sense,
notwithstanding they do not involve concluding contracts. In other words, the fundamental principle underlying the (doing business' concept seems to be the
maintenance within the jurisdiction of a regular, continuous course of business activities, whether or not
this includes the final stages of contracting. Consequently it is clear that if, in addition to a regular course
of solicitation, other business activities are carried on,
such as maintaining a warehouse, making deliveries,
etc., the corporation is cpresent' for jurisdictional purposes. And very little more than cmere solicitation' is
required to bring about this result."
The Court stated, at page 375 .
CCThis court, in holding that under our statute maintenance of an office by a foreign corporation for its
solicitors subjects it to service of process, said:
celt seems to us that some of the courts have been
impressed too much with the rule existing at common
law, namely, that a corporation cannot migrate and
hence is to be served with legal progess only at the
place where it is created, and hence these courts have
placed rather a strict construction upon statutes by
which the power to serve legal process on foreign corporations is given. It is self-evident that a corporation
10
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can act and be acted upon only through its agents. If
thus notice of any kind or character is to be brought
home to the corporation, it must be done by notifying
one of its accredited agents. The .character of such
agent and the manner of making service of legal
process upon a foreign corporation must, to a large
extent at least, be left to the sound discretion of the
legislative power. So long as notice to corporations
amounts to due process of law, the mere manner of
service or the agent upon whom service is made is not
of controlling importance. The only legal question
really involved is whether the agent upon whom service is made is one who is directly connected with the
corporate affairs, or is conducting some of the corporate business of the corporation, so that through
him the corporation is legally represented. If such be
the case, we cannot see that the nature or the amount
of business that an agent transacts in a foreign state
is of great importance. * * * "
Certainly the facts in this case are as strong or stronger
than the facts in the Kemmerer Coal Co. case. It can make
little difference whether a non-resident corporation actually
owned the furniture in the office, and actually employed the
persons working therein, or whether it obtained such services
of another company already available upon the payment of
a consideration. Here, all of the services were rendered to
Charles Antell, Inc., in regard to the taking and filling of
orders, which it could have performed itself had it opened
up its own office, bought its own furniture, and itself employed
the girl therein working to answer the switchboard. Furthermore, the advertising of a telephone number on television as
belonging to Charles Antell, Inc., and as being the number
at which the public could do business with such company,
is just as strong a circumstance as if such telephone number
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

had actually been listed in the telephone directory as belonging to Charles Antell, Inc.
In addition to these facts, we have a much stronger set
of circumstances in this case than in the Kemmerer Coal Co.
case, in that in the Kemmerer Coal Co. case the court found
there was no contract consummated within the State of Utah
fur the purchase of coal, but that such contracts were consumtnatcd within the State of Utah for the purchase of coal,
but that such contracts were consummated in the State of
Wyoming. In the case now before the Court, all of the circumstances indicate, as pointed out above, that the actual contract for the purchase was consummated in the State of Utah
by the agents of Charles Antell, Inc., at Television Station
KDYL.
There 1s no diversity of holding on the question of
\vhether a corporation is present in the state where it actually ·
consummates contracts therein during a regular and continuous
course of business.
As was stated in the case of Dahl v. Collette, a Minnesota
case, 279, N.W. 561:
(Solicitation in the regular course of business, together with acceptance and performance of the contract within the state, will give ample ground for the
conclusion of corporate presence."
t

See also in support of this position, Martin v. Barrett-Cravens
Co., 298 N. Y. Supplement 101.
Furthermore, the cases are quite clear that where there
is a continuous course of business in a state, the corporation
is present to do business.
12
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In the case of Williams z·. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 35 Fed.
Supplement, 847, in passing upon the question of whether or
not it would be a burden on interstate commerce to hold a
corporation present in a state for the purpose of serving process, the Federal Court said:
"However, it is also well settled that although the
business transacted by a corporation may be entirely
interstate in character, yet where the agent of a foreign
corporation does more than engage in a mere solicitation and there is a continuous course of shipments
of articles into the State, such acts manifest its presence within the State and make it subje<:t to the jurisdiction of the courts of that State."
This same holding is followed in the case of Hunan v.
Northern Region Supply Corporation, 262 Fed. 181, and in
the case of Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, a
decision written by Justice Cordoza.
In the case now before the Court, there can be no question
but what there is a continous and regular course of business
involved. The corporation was soliciting business in Utah
prior to the time that Mrs. Betty Anderson McGriff purchased
her jar of cream on the 14th day of February, 1952, and,
according to the testimony of Mrs. Thurmond, was still soliciting business in a regular television program on the 21st day
of May, 1952.·
The plaintiff did not go into the State of Maryland seeking to do business with the defendant corporation, rather the
defendant corporation came into the State of Utah seeking
the business of the plaintiff. To hold that the plaintiff shall
IS
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

have to go back to the State of Ma~yland to sue the defendant
corporation, would be tantamount to taking away her right
of recovery, for although she would have a legal right to sue
in the State of Maryland; practical difficulties would make it
impossible.
The inequity of this situation and the law of this state
governing the matter could not be more clearly set out than
it is in the language of Justice McDonough in the case of
7

lf abash Railroad Co. v. District Court for Third Judicial Dis-

trict, in and for Salt Lake County, 167 Pac. (2d) 973. The
Court, through Justice McDonough, stated at page 978:
c CWhen a resident of the forum suffers a loss, and
a foreign corporation which is alleged to be liable
therefor, is present in the forum by solicitation of the
kind and character of business out of which the loss
arose, it \vould be an undue burden on the one suffering
the loss to be compelled to go into some other state to
bring an action when the transaction out of which
the loss arose was one solicited in the state where the
plaintiff resides. To have redress a shipper must have
access to the courts. If he must accept the settlement
proposed by some claim agent or have to go into some
distant state at an expense of perhaps several times
the amount of the claim, in many instances the shipper
would be denied redress. Where, as here, the plaintiff
in the suit is a bona fide resident and domicile of the
forum; where the damages claimed allegedly resulted
from a delict by carrier or its failure to perform a
contract in accordance with the applicable rules of law,
in connection with a transaction entered into in this
state by the . aqent o~ the ca.rr.i~r a?d the plaintiff;
and the earner s bustness actlvttles 1n this state are
such as are revealed by the recited facts herein· it is

14
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'

not an undue burden on interstate commerce to require
the defendant carrier to here contest such suit.''

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff submits that the defendant corporation was
doing business within the State of Utah, that the service of
summons was made upon a proper person, and that the order
of the lower court quashing service of summons should be
set aside.
Respectfully submitted,

CALVIN L. RAMPTON,
Attorney for Appellant.
721 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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